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RE-EXAMINING THE ROLE OF PATENTS IN
APPROPRIATING THE VALUE OF DNA SEQUENCES'
Rebecca S. Eisenberg*
As public and private sector initiatives race to complete the sequence of the
human genome, 1 patent issues have played a prominent role in speculations
about the significance of this achievement. 2 How much of the genome will be
subject to the control of patent holders, and what will this mean for future
research and the development of products for the improvement of human
health? 3 Is a patent system developed to establish rights in mechanical
inventions of an earlier era up to the task of resolving competing claims to the
genome 4 on behalf of the many sequential innovators who elucidate its
sequence and function,5 with due regard to the interests of the scientific
community 6 and the broader public? 7
t Copyright © 2000 Rebecca S. Eisenberg.
* Robert & Barbara Luciano Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. A.B., Stanford
University (1975); J.D., University of California, Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall) (1979). I am grateful
to Robert Cook-Deegan, Ronald Mann, Margaret Parr, and workshop participants at Haifa University, the
University of Washington, Harvard University, Lewis & Clark University, the University of Minnesota, Emory
University, the University of Pennsylvania, Princeton University, Stanford University, and the University of
California at Berkeley for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1 See Paul Smaglik, A Billion Base Pairs,Times Two, THE SCIENTIST, Dec. 6, 1999, at 8; Justin Gillis &
Rick Weiss, Private Firm Aims to Beat Government to Gene Map, WASH. POST, May 12, 1998, at Al; Philip
E. Ross, The Making of a Gene Machine, FORBEs, Feb. 21, 2000, at 98; Nicholas Wade, 2 Groups in DNA
Race Differ on Fixing Project'sFinish Line, N.Y. TIMDs, Apr. 11, 2000, at A27; Nicholas Wade, Scientist's
Plan: Map All DNA Within 3 Years, N.Y. TSMES, May 10, 1998, at Al; Francis S. Collins, The Sequence ofthe
Human Genome: Coming a Lot Sooner Than You Think (visited Jan. 10, 2000) <http://www.nhgri.nih.gov/
NEWS>.
2 See Justin Gillis, Md Gene Researcher Draws Fire on Filings; Venter Defends Patent Requests,
WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1999, at El; Peter G. Gosselin, Patent Office Now at Heart of Gene Debate, L.A.
TImEs, Feb. 7,2000, at Al; Ralph T. King, Jr., Code Green: Gene Quest Will Bring Glory to Some; Incyte Will
Stick With Cash, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2000, at Al.
3 See Peter G. Gosselin, Clinton Urges Public Access to Genetic Code, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 11, 2000, at
Al; Peter G. Gosselin & Paul Jacobs, Clinton, Blairto Back Access to Genetic Code, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14,
2000, at Cl.
4 See, e.g., Philippe Ducor, Recombinant Products and Nonobviousness: A Typology, 13 COMPUTER &
HIGH TCH. L.J. 1 (1997); Karen F. Lech, Ph.D., Note, Human Genes Without Functions:Biotechnology Tests
the PatentUtility Standard,27 SUFFOLKU. L. REv. 1631 (1993).
5 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Structure and Function in Gene Patenting, 15 NATURE GENETCs 125
(1997); Stanley Fields, The Future is Function, 15 NATURE GENIqCS 325 (1997).
6 See Martin Enserink, PatentOffice May Raise the Baron Gene Claims, 287 SCaENCE 1196 (2000).
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Given that applicants have been seeking and obtaining patent claims on
DNA sequences for twenty years, 8 one might expect that the Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO") and courts would have resolved many of the legal
issues surrounding this practice.
The patent system has had many
opportunities to apply traditional patent law principles to a broad range of
issues involving genetic discoveries as the industry has pursued and litigated
patent claims covering biotechnology products. 9 One might therefore expect
that biotechnology patent law would now be entering a relatively mature phase
in which fundamental questions have been resolved and the issues that remain
to be addressed are incremental and interstitial. Instead, the patent system is
struggling to clarify the ground rules for patenting DNA sequences, while
years worth of patent applications accumulate in the PTO. What accounts for
this persistent lack of clarity regarding how patent law applies to these
discoveries?
A significant part of the problem is that new technologies are rapidly
changing how discoveries are made in genetics and genomics research. The
patent system, which inevitably requires years to resolve even routine
matters,' has so far focused primarily on the discoveries of the 1980s. DNA
sequences that were the subject of patent claims in that era typically consisted
of cloned genes that enabled the production of proteins through recombinant
DNA technology." Patents on the genes encoding these proteins promised exclusivity in the market for the protein itself, equivalent to the protection that a
pharmaceutical firm obtains by patenting a new chemical compound that can
be used as a drug. From this perspective, patents on DNA sequences seemed
analogous to patents on new chemical entities. The Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit accordingly turned to prior cases considering patents on
chemicals in resolving disputed issues about how patent law should apply to
7 See Jon F. Merz et al., DiseaseGene PatentingIs a Bad Innovation, 2 MoLEcULAR DIAGNOSIS 299304(1997).
8 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg,Patentingthe Human Genome, 39 EMORY LJ. 721 (1990).
9 See, e.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (FLAVR SAVR®
tomato); Bio-Technology General Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (human growth
hormone); Novo Nordisk of North Amer., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 77 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (human
growth hormone); Genentech, Inc. v. The Wellcome Found., Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (tissue
plasminogen activator); Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (human growth
hormone); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (erythropoietin); Scripps Clinic
& Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (Factor vrl:C); Hormone Research
Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (human growth hormone).
10 Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical Study ofthe Twenty-Year PatentTerm, 22 AIPLA QJ. 369 (1994).
11 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,703,008, October 27, 1987 (DNA sequences encoding erythropoietin).
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Whatever the limitations of this analogy, it provided a

relatively clear point of departure for analyzing patent law issues presented by
the first generation of biotechnology products-therapeutic proteins produced
through recombinant DNA technology.
As DNA sequence discovery has moved beyond targeted efforts to clone
particular genes to large-scale, high-throughput sequencing of entire genomes,
new questions have emerged. The DNA sequences identified by highthroughput sequencing look less like new chemical entities than they do like
new scientific information. From the perspective of patent claimants, the
chemical analogy is of little value as a strategic guide to exploiting this
information as intellectual property. From the perspective of the PTO and
courts, claims to these discoveries raise unresolved questions that strain the
chemical analogy. The result is profound uncertainty concerning how to apply
the doctrinal tools of patent law for determining what may be patented and for
drawing boundaries between the rights of inventors and the rights of the public.

I. PATENT ELIGIBimrY
A threshold issue that one might expect to have been resolved long ago is
whether DNA sequences are the sort of subject matter that the patent system
protects. The U.S. patent statute defines patent-eligible subject matter as "any
... process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter."13 The U.S.
Supreme Court has held that this language encompasses an expansive scope
that includes "anything under the sun that is made by man."' 14 Although cases
have held that "products of nature" may.not be patented, this exclusion has not
presented an obstacle to patenting DNA seqIuences in forms that do not occur
in nature as new "compositions of matter."' On the threshold issue of patenteligible subject matter, as on other issues, the analogy to chemical patent
practice has supplied an answer.
The standard patent lawyer's response to the "products of nature" limitation
is to treat it as a technical, claim-drafting problem. From this perspective, the
prohibition against patenting products of nature only prevents the patenting of
DNA sequences in a naturally occurring form that requires no human
12 See, e.g., Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1200 ("A gene is a chemical compound, albeit a complex one.").
" 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
14 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citing S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R.
REP. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
15 See supranote 11.
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intervention. One cannot get a patent on a DNA sequence with claim language
that would be infringed by someone whose DNA continues to do what it has
done for generations in nature. But one can get a patent on the same DNA
sequence with more limited claim language that could only be infringed
through the intervention of modem biotechnology.
Patents have thus issued on "isolated and purified" DNA sequences,
separate from the chromosomes in which they occur in nature, or on DNA
sequences that have been spliced into recombinant vectors or introduced into
recombinant cells of a sort that do not exist in nature. 16 This is consistent with
longstanding practice, even prior to the advent of modem biotechnology, of
allowing patents to issue on isolated and purified chemical products that exist
in nature only in an impure state, when human intervention has made them
available in a new and useful form. 17 This is not simply a lawyer's trick, but a
persuasive response to the intuition that patents should only issue for human
inventions. It prevents the issuance of patents that take away from the public
things that they were previously using (such as the DNA that resides in their
cells), while allowing patents to issue on new human manipulations of nature.
Those of us who simply use the DNA in our own cells, as our ancestors have
been doing for generations, should not and need not worry about patent
infringement liability. On the other hand, those of us who get injections of
recombinant insulin or erythropoietin should in fairness expect to pay a patent
premium to the inventors who made these technological interventions possible.
The patentability of DNA molecules in forms that involve human
intervention appears to be well settled. But recent advances in DNA
sequencing raise the question of patent eligibility in a new way that courts have
yet to address.
II. MOLECULES VS. INFORMATION
DNA sequences are not simply molecules, they are also information.
Knowing the DNA sequence for the genome of an organism provides valuable
16 Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1959 (D. Mass. 1990) ("The
invention claimed in the '008 patent is not as plaintiff argues the DNA sequence encoding human EPO since
that is a nonpatentable natural phenomenon 'free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.' ... Rather, the
invention as claimed in claim 2 of the patent is the "purified and isolated" DNA sequence encoding
erythropoietin.") (quoting Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 309).
17 See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1958) (upholding the
patentability of purified Vitamin B-12).
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scientific information that can open the door to future discoveries. Can the
value of this information be captured through patents? Can information about
the natural world, as distinguished from tangible human interventions that
make use of that information, be patented?
The traditional statutory categories of patent-eligible subject matter-processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter-seem to
be limited to tangible products and processes, as distinguished from
information as such. Although many cases have used the word "tangible" in
defining the boundaries of patentable subject matter, neither the language of
the statute nor judicial decisions elaborating its meaning have explicitly
excluded "informationf" from patent protection. Arguably, such a limitation is
implicit in prior judicial decisions stating that the patent system protects
practical applications rather than fundamental new insights about the natural
world'8 and9 in cases holding that "printed matter" is ineligible for patent
protection.
The exclusion of information itself from patent protection is also at least
implicit in the statutory requirement that patent applicants make full
disclosures of information about their inventions, with no restrictions upon
public access to the disclosures once the patents issue. 20 One important
function of patent disclosures is to enable the public to use inventions freely as
soon as the patents expire, but this function alone cannot explain why patent
law requires that disclosures become freely accessible to the public at the
beginning of the patent term. The timing of the disclosure requirement
suggests another function that is inconsistent with patent claims that cover the
disclosed information itself. In the words of a leading commentator, "full
2
18 See, e.g., Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 309 ("Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E--mc ; nor
could Newton have patented the law of gravity. Such discoveries are 'manifestations of... nature, free to all
men and reserved exclusively to none."') (citing Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130
(1948)); Dickey-John Corp. v. International Tapetronics Corp., 710 F.2d 329, 348 n.9 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Yet
patent law has never been the domain of the abstract-one cannot patent the very discoveries which make the
greatest contributions to human knowledge, such as Einstein's discovery of the photoelectric effect nor has it
ever been considered that the lure of commercial reward provided by a patent was needed to encourage such
contributions. Patent law's domain has always been the application of the great discoveries of the human
intellect to the mundane problems of everyday existence.").
19 See, e.g., In re Russell, 48 F.2d 668 (C.C.P.A. 1931); Guthrie v. Curlett, 10 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1926).
More recent decisions, while not explicitly overruling these prior cases, seem to limit the vitality of the printed
matter exclusion from patentability. See, e.g., In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (reversing PTO
"printed matter" rejection of patent claims to a data structure for storing, using and managing data in a
computer memory).
2 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 154(a)(4) (1994). See In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
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disclosure ... on issuance of the patent immediately increases the 2storehouse
1
of public information available for further research and innovation."
Patent claims on DNA sequences as "compositions of matter" give patent
owners exclusionary rights over tangible DNA molecules and constructs, but
do not prevent anyone from perceiving, using, and analyzing information about
what the DNA sequence is. Once the patent issues, this information becomes
freely available, subject only to the inventor's right to exclude others from
making using, and selling the claimed materials. For patents on genes that
encode therapeutic proteins, the value of this exclusionary right over tangible
compositions of matter has been sufficiently large relative to the value of the
information that spills over to the public through the patent disclosure to
motivate inventors to file patent applications rather than to keep the sequence
secret. 22 The commercially significant aspect of these discoveries was not the
informational value of knowing what the sequence was, but the tangible value
of being able to use the DNA molecules in recombinant production facilities to
make therapeutic proteins for sale. So long as patents permitted capture of this
tangible, commercial value, there was no need to withhold the sequence
information from the public.
In contrast, in the contemporary setting of high-throughput DNA
sequencing, there is immediate commercial value in knowing what the
sequence is, while the commercial value of using particular portions of the
sequence as tangible templates for protein production is remote and
speculative. There are two reasons why informational value looms large
relative to tangible value in this context, in contrast to the targeted cloning
projects of an earlier era that yielded sequences encoding products of known
value. First, high-throughput DNA sequencing typically yields information
about DNA sequences for which the corresponding biological functions are not
yet understood. It is thus unclear at the time of sequencing whether a
particular sequence will have tangible value. Second, high-throughput DNA
sequencing typically yields considerable chaff (in the form of non-coding
sequences and sequences that do not correspond to any apparent commercial
products) along with the occasional bit of wheat (in the form of sequences
encoding commercially valuable proteins or offering other uses in tangible
form). What is most valuable about these research results, at least initially, is
21 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 7.01, at 7-3 (1999).
22 Indeed, the scientists who cloned the genes encoding the first generation of biotechnology products
typically published the DNA sequences they identified long before the corresponding patents issued (although
after filing patent applications to avoid loss of patent rights outside the U.S.).
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that they provide an information base for future discovery. DNA molecules
corresponding to some portions of the sequence, such as those portions that
encode valuable proteins or that are the site of diagnostic markers, may
ultimately prove valuable as tangible compositions of matter. But it might not
be immediately apparent just where in the sequence these nuggets of tangible
value lie.
It is not obvious how an inventor might use patents to capture the value of
DNA sequence discoveries under these circumstances. It may be difficult to
draft claim language2 that covers the portions of the sequence that prove to
have tangible value without claiming either too broadly (rendering the claim
invalid because it covers similar sequences that have already been disclosed in
the prior art),24 or too narrowly (rendering the claim easy to evade through
minor changes in the molecule). 25 More importantly, claim language that is
directed to tangible molecules fails to capture the informational value of
knowing the sequence itself. If this informational value is great relative to the
speculative value of tangible molecules corresponding to portions of the
sequence, the more sensible strategy may be to sell access to a proprietary
database of sequence information. So far, database subscriptions have been the
principle source of revenue for most private firms involved in high-throughput
DNA 2 6sequencing, although the same firms have also filed patent applications.

73 The language of patent claims defines the scope of the patent holder's exclusionary rights. See 35
U.S.C. § 112 (1994); Exparte Fressola, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1608 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1993).
24 A broad claim is a claim that has few limitations. One might, for example, seek a claim that covers
any molecule that includes (or "comprises," in the vernacular of patent law) at least ten consecutive
nucleotides from the disclosed sequence. If allowed, such a claim would be very broad in that it would be
likely to cover any portion of the sequence that later proves to encode a valuable protein. But the breadth of
the claim makes it more likely that it will be held invalid. The claim would be invalid if any previously
disclosed DNA sequence included any 10 consecutive nucleotides that were identical to any portion of the
sequence disclosed in the patent appplication. The shorter the portion of the disclosed sequence that is
necessary to establish infringement, the broader the claim. But the broader the claim, the easier it is to find
"prior art" disclosures that would fall within the scope of the claim, rendering the claim invalid. See, e.g.,
Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that when a "claim covers
several compositions, the claim is [invalid] if one of them is in the prior art') (emphasis added).
25 A narrow claim is a claim that has many limitations. One might, for example, claim the entire
disclosed sequence as an isolated molecule. Because every element of the claim must be present in a
competitor's product to establish infringement, a competitor who made a DNA molecule that included only a
portion ofthe disclosed sequence corresponding to a particular protein would not be liable.
26 See King, supranote 2.
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CLAIMING COMPUTER-READABLE INFORMATION

Another strategy that the PTO is currently facing but courts have yet to
consider seeks to capture the informational value of DNA sequences through
patent claims directed toward DNA sequences stored in a computer-readable
medium. An early example of this strategy is the patent application filed by
Human Genome Sciences ("HGS") on the sequence of the Haemophilus
influenzae Rd genome. 27 This patent application has not yet issued as a patent
anywhere in the world, but it was published eighteen months after its filing
date under the terms of the Patent Cooperation Treaty. 28 Haemophilus
influenzae is a bacterial strain that causes ear and respiratory tract infections in
humans, and was the first bacterium to have its genome fully sequenced.2 9
The fate of the related patent applications may offer a preview of how the
patent system will allocate patent rights in future genomic discoveries. HGS
filed a patent application setting forth the complete nucleotide sequence of the
genome, identified as "SEQ ID NO.1.''3° The application concluded with a
series of claims representing the invention to which HGS sought exclusive
rights. The first of these claims read as follows:
Computer-readable medium having recorded thereon the nucleotide
sequence depicted in SEQ ID NO:l, a representative fragment
identical to the
thereof or a nucleotide sequence at least 99.9%
31
nucleotide sequence depicted in SEQ ID NO: 1.
It bears emphasizing that this is not yet an issued patent. The foregoing claim
language, in effect, is the first item on the wish list of HGS for patent rights
associated with the discovery of the H. influenzae genome.
This claiming strategy represents a fundamental departure from the
previously sanctioned practice of claiming DNA sequences as tangible
molecules. By claiming exclusionary rights in the sequence information itself,
27 Nucleotide Sequence of the Haemophilus influenzae Rd Genome, Fragments Thereof, and Uses
Thereof, WO 96133276, PCTIUS96105320 (international patent application published under the Patent
Cooperation Treaty on October 24, 1996).
28 Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, art. 21(2), 28 U.S.T. 7645 (197) (providing for the
publication of international patent applications 18 months after their priority dates).
29 See R.D. Fleischmann et al., Whole-Genome Random Sequencing and Assembly of Haemophilus
influenzae Rd., 269 SCIENcE 496 (1995).
30 The sequencing was done at The Institute for Genomic Research ("TIGR"), a private, non-profit
organization affiliated with HGS at the time. Pursuant to an agreement between TIGR and HGS, patent rights
in the H. influenzae genome were assigned to HGS.
31 See supra note 27.
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if stored in a computer-readable medium,32 HGS seeks patent rights that would
be infringed by information storage, retrieval, and analysis rather than simply
by making, using, or selling DNA molecules. It remains to be seen whether
the PTO will issue such a claim,
or whether a rejection would stand up on
33
appeal to the Federal Circuit.
IV. EXPANSIVE TREND OF CASE LAW

Recent decisions concerning the patentability of computer-implemented
inventions may provide more guidance than prior decisions concerning the
patentability of discoveries in the life sciences in predicting whether DNA
sequence information stored in computer-readable medium may be patented.
The overall trend of decisions in the Federal Circuit is toward expansive
interpretation of the scope of patent eligible subject matter-even for
categories of inventions that prior decisions seemed to exclude from the
protection of the patent statute-in order to make the patent system
"responsive to the needs of the modem world. ' 34 The most conspicuous recent
example of this trend was the 1998 decision in State Street Bank & Trust v.
Signature Financial Group upholding the patentability of a computerimplemented accounting system for managing the flow of funds in partnerships
of mutual funds that pool their assets.3 5 This invention arguably fell within
previously apparent judicial limitations that excluded mathematical
algorithms 36 and business methods37 from patent protection.

The Federal

Circuit minimized the first of these limitations, 38 holding that it only excluded
from patent protection "abstract ideas constituting disembodied concepts or
truths that are not 'useful."' 39 It then repudiated the second, insisting that
"[t]he business method exception has never been invoked by this court, or [its
32 The meaning of this term could be quite broad. See infra text accompanying notes 49-50.
33 An applicant whose claims have been rejected by a PTO examiner twice may appeal to the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences. See 35 U.S.C. § 134 (1994). An applicant who is dissatisfied with the
decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences may appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit. 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1994).
34 AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1356 (1999). For a critical examination
of the recent expansion in patent eligibility, see John R. Thomas, The Post-IndustrialPatent System, 10
FOPDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. LU. 3 (1999).

'- 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. deniedt 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
36 See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
37 See Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908).
38 The exclusion of mathematical algorithms from patent protection had already been substantially
restricted by prior decisions of the Federal Circuit. See, e.g., In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
31 State Street Bank & Trust, 149 F.3d at 1373.
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predecessor], to deem an invention unpatentable," and that other courts that
had appeared to apply the business method exception always had other
independent grounds for arriving at the same decisions without needing
S40 to rely
on a categorical exclusion of business methods from patent protection.
Rather than seeing the language of section 101 of the Patent Act, which
permits patents to issue for "any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter," as a significant limitation on the types
of advances that might qualify for patent protection, the Federal Circuit
characterizes this language as a "seemingly limitless expanse," subject only to
three "specifically identified ... categories of unpatentable subject matter:
'laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas."' 41 From this
perspective, it is not obvious why DNA sequence information stored in
computer-readable medium-a product that requires human intervention and
serves human purposes-would be categorically excluded from patent
protection.
V. PTO GUIDELINES

Of course, DNA sequence information stored in computer-readable
medium is not the same thing as a computer-implemented business method,
and it is certainly possible to define boundaries for the patent system that
include the latter but not the former. Indeed, the PTO's Examination
Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions exclude data stored in computerreadable medium from patent protection. 42 The guidelines distinguish between
"functional descriptive material" (such as "data structures and computer
programs which impart functionality when encoded on a computer-readable
medium"), and "non-functional descriptive material" (such as "music, literary
works and a compilation or mere arrangement of data [which] is not
structurally and functionally interrelated to the medium but is merely carried
by the medium"). 43 Although functional descriptive material generally will fall
40 Id. at 1375-76.
41 Excel Communications, 172 F.3d at 1355 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)).
42 Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478 (1996).
43 Id. The focus on functional relationship between data and substrate echoes language from In reLowry,
32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994), in which the Federal Circuit upheld the patentability of a data structure for
storing, using and managing data in a computer memory. In that case, the Board of Patent Appeals reversed
the examiner's rejection of the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as claiming non-statutory subject matter, and the
issue of patentable subject matter was therefore not properly before the court on appeal. Id. Nonetheless, in
its analysis of the remaining issues of patentability under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, the court drew a
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within the statutory categories of patent-eligible subject matter, the guidelines
state that non-functional descriptive material generally will not meet the
statutory limitations: "Merely claiming non-functional descriptive material
stored in a computer-readable medium does not make it statutory. Such a
result would exalt form over substance." 44 DNA sequence information stored
in a computer-readable medium seems to fall squarely within the PTO's
definition of "non-functional descriptive material" that is "merely carried by"
the computer-readable medium and is not functionally interrelated to it. 45
If the PTO continues to follow these four-year-old guidelines, it should
reject claims to DNA sequence stored in computer-readable medium. But if a
disgruntled patent applicant appeals to the Federal Circuit, that court might
well reverse the rejection. The distinction between tangible molecules and
intangible information may do little work today in delineating the boundaries
of patent eligibility in the face of recent decisions de-emphasizing the
importance of physical limitations in establishing the patentability of
computer-implemented inventions. This shift in emphasis is particularly
apparent in AT&T v. Excel Communications,46 in which the Federal Circuit
distinction between claiming information content and claiming a functional structure for managing
information:
Contrary to the PTO's assertion, Lowry does not claim merely the information content of a
memory. Lowry's data structures, while including data resident in a database, depend only
functionally on information content. While the information content affects the exact sequence of
bits stored in accordance with Lowry's data structures, the claims require specific electronic
structural elements which impart a physical organization on the information stored in memory.
Lowry's invention manages information. As Lowry notes, the data structures provide increased
computing efficiency.
Id. at 1583.
44 Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. at 7478. This qualification in
the Guidelines responds to a rhetorical question posed by Judge Archer in his dissenting opinion from the en
bancdecision of the Federal Circuit in In reAlappat,33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1996). In that case, a majority of
the court upheld the patentability of a claim to a computer-implemented mechanism for improving the quality
of a picture in an oscilloscope. Judge Archer cautioned against the potential implications of allowing patent
claims on mathematical algorithms stored in computer-readable medium in his dissenting opinion, asking
rhetorically whether a piece of music recorded on a compact disc or player piano roll would be patentable:
Through the expedient of putting his music on known structure, can a composer now claim as his
invention the structure of a compact disc or player piano roll containing the melody he discovered
and obtain a patent therefor? The answer must be no. The composer admittedly has invented or
discovered nothing but music. The discovery of music does not become patentable subject matter
simply because there is an arbitrary claim to some structure.
33 F.3d at 1554 (Archer, CJ., dissenting).
45 Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. at 7478.
46 172 F.3d 1352, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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explicitly declined to focus on the "physical limitations inquiry" that had
played a central role in distinguishing between unpatentable mathematical
algorithms and patentable computer-implemented inventions in its prior
decisions. Instead, the court asked "whether the mathematical algorithm is
applied in a practical manner to produce a useful result." 47 This approach
seems to merge the issue of patent eligibility with the issue of utility, opening
the door to patent claims to information so long as it is "useful."
VI. TRADITIONAL PATENT BARGAIN

If the Federal Circuit steps back from the momentum of its recent decisions
expanding the boundaries of the patent system, it should not be persuaded that
information stored in computer-readable medium is patentable. Patent claims
to information-even useful information-represent a fundamental departure
from the traditional patent bargain. That bargain has always called for free
disclosure of information to the public at the outset of the patent term in
exchange for exclusionary rights in particular tangible applications until the

patent expires.48

Patent claims that are infringed by mere perception and

analysis of the information set forth in the patent disclosure undermine the
strong policy preventing patent applicants from restricting access to the
disclosure once the patent has issued.4 9 The limitation that the information be
stored in computer-readable medium offers scant protection for the public
interest in free access to the informational content of patent disclosures.
Scanning technologies arguably bring paper printouts of DNA sequence
information within the scope of the claim language, an interpretation that
would make copying the patent document itself an act of infringement. Even if
the claim language is more narrowly interpreted to cover only electronic
media, numerous websites post the full text of issued patents, including a
website maintained by the PTO.5 0 Any claim that would count these postings
as acts of infringement simply proves too much.
Patents on information surely represent a departure from tradition. But
departure from tradition may not be a sufficient ground to reject them in light
of the increasing importance of information products to technological progress.
47 id. at 1360.

48 See supranotes 20-21 and accompanying text.
49 See In re Argoudells, 434 F.2d 1340, 1394-96 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (Baldwin, J.,
concurring); Feldman v.
Aunstrup, 517 F.2d 1351, 1355 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
50 See Patent Infornation and Searchable Database (visited Sept. 8, 2000) <http:llwww.uspto.gov/
web/menu/pats.html>.
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Perhaps the traditional bargain of free disclosure of information in exchange
for exclusionary rights that are limited to tangible applications makes no sense
in this new environment. If the value of unprotectible information gained from
high-throughput DNA sequencing is great relative to the value of tangible
molecules that might be covered by established claiming strategies, patents that
do not allow the inventor to capture the value of the information might not do
enough to motivate investment in DNA sequencing. This may seem unlikely
as an empirical matter, given the substantial investments that are being made in
DNA sequencing efforts in both the public and private sectors with no clear
precedent for capturing the informational value of this investment through the
patent system,51 but it is at least a logical possibility. A more plausible
speculation is that inventors will forego the patent bargain if they are stuck
with the traditional terms of that bargain, choosing instead to exploit their
52
discoveries through restricted access to proprietary DNA sequence databases.
Although the conventional wisdom in the patent community is that patent
protection promotes the public interest in technological progress better than
trade secrecy, it is by no means clear that the public interest in progress in
genomics would be better served by issuing patents on DNA sequence
information in computer-readable medium than by relying on trade secrecy to
motivate investment in DNA sequence databases. If the terms of the
traditional patent bargain are altered to allow patent holders to capture the
informational value of their discoveries, the bargain becomes less attractive to
the public. The public might be better off withholding patents and allowing
others to derive the same information independently. Withholding patents
makes particular sense if the efforts of the patent holder are not necessary to
bring the information into the public domain. Much DNA sequence
information is freely disclosed in the public domain, both by publicly funded
researchers and by private firms. If a discovery is likely to be made and
disclosed promptly even without patent incentives, there is little point in
enduring the social costs of exclusionary rights.53
51 See, e.g., Barry A. Palevitz, Rice Genome Gets a Boost: PrivateSequencing Effort Yields Rough Draft
for the Public,THE SCIENTIST, May 1, 2000, at 1.

52 In fact, private firms that invest in DNA sequencing appear to be pursuing a dual strategy of licensing

access to proprietary databases while pursuing traditional composition of matter patents on particular
sequences within those databases that appear likely to correspond to valuable tangible products. See Ralph T.
King, Jr., supra note 2.
53 Normally the nonobviousness standard set forth at 35 U.S.C. § 103 prevents the issuance ofpatents on
inventions that are highly likely to be made independently by another inventor by excluding from patent
protection inventions that would have been "obvious" to persons of ordinary skill in the field of the invention
given the state of the art. This standard fails to serve this important function in the context of DNA sequencing
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VII. BRIcKs AND MORTAR RULES FOR INFORMATION GOODS
There are sound policy reasons to be wary of permitting use of the patent
system to capture the value of information itself. The traditional patent bargain
ensures that patenting promptlr enriches the information base, even as it slows
down commercial imitation.
This balances the interests of inventors in
earning a return on past research investments against the interests of the larger
public in promoting future research. If patent claims could prevent the
perception and analysis of information, this balance would tilt sharply in favor
of patent owners.
Even if some form of intellectual property protection for information is
necessary to promote investment in the creation of new information products,
one might question whether the patent system is a suitable model. Compared
to other forms of intellectual property protection, such as copyrights and trade
secrets, there are few safety valves built into the patent system that constrain
the rights of patent holders in favor of competing interests of the public.
Unlike copyright law, patent law has no fair use defense that permits socially
valuable uses without a license. 55 Contrary to the understanding of many
scientists, patent law has only a "truly narrow" research exemption that offers
no protection from infringement liability for research activities that are
commercially threatening to the patent holder.56 Nor is independent creation a
defense to atent infringement, in contrast to both copyright law57 and trade
secret law. Unlike trade secret law, patent law has no defense for reverse
engineering.59 The most important concession to the competing interests of the
public that is built into a patent, apart from its finite term, is the disclosure
because of decisions of the Federal Circuit upholding the patentability of newly identified DNA sequences
discovered through routine work, so long as the prior art did not permit prediction of the structure of the DNA
molecule. See In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
54 See supranotes 44-48 and accompanying text.
55 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). For an interesting analysis of whether a fair use defense would make sense
for the patent system, see Maureen A. O'Rourke, Towards a DoctrineofFairUse in PatentLaw, 100 COLUM.
L REV. 1177 (2000).
56 Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984). For a fuller
discussion of the research exemption, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science:
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. Cm. L REv. 1017 (1989).
57 See 2 PAUL GOLDSTEN, COPYRIGHT § 7.1.1, at 7:2 (2d ed. 1996) ("Infringement turns strictly on proof
of copying and improper appropriation.").
58 See, e.g., Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400,404 (9th Cir. 1982).
59 See Kewanee Oil v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470, 490 (1974); Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus.,
Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 178 (7th Cir. 1991).
60 The rule for determining the expiration date of a U.S. patent was changed in 1995 by the Uruguay
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requirement. 61 By requiring full disclosure of how to make and use the
invention, and by mandating that this disclosure become freely available as
soon as the patent issues, the patent system in effect permits unlicensed use of
information about the invention, as distinguished from use of the tangible
invention itself. But if patents issue that restrict the public from perceiving and
analyzing information about the invention, the claim effectively defeats that
safety valve.
If information is not appropriate subject matter for patent protection, does it
follow that DNA sequences should not be patented at all? The foregoing
discussion distinguishes between patent claims to DNA sequences stored in
computer-readable medium, which are tantamount to patent claims on
information itself, and traditional patent claims to DNA molecules and
constructs. But perhaps any principle that excludes information from patent
protection has broader implications for patents on DNA sequences. DNA
molecules may be thought of as a tangible storage medium for information
about the structure of proteins. Cells read the information stored in DNA
molecules to make the proteins that they need to survive in their environments,
and they copy that information when they divide and reproduce.62 If DNA
sequence information is not patentable when it is stored in an electronic
medium that is readable by computers, how can it nonetheless be patented
when stored in a molecular medium that is readable by living cells?
A quick answer is that information stored in a computer-readable medium
is directed at the human observers who are the intended beneficiaries of the
information spillovers that arise through patent disclosures. It is therefore
human-readable information that must not be patented as such in order to
maintain a balance between the exclusionary rights of patent holders and the
rights of the public to use the disclosures that are the quid pro quo of those
exclusionary rights. But humans can direct queries to DNA sequence
information whether it is stored in molecular form or in electronic form. One
might, for example, use DNA molecules as probes to detect the presence of a
particular DNA sequence in a sample. This sort of molecular query has

Round Amendments Act, Pub. L No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994 &
Supp. 2000)). Prior to passage of that Act, U.S. patents expired 17 years after the date that they were issued,
regardless of their application filing dates. The new rule, applicable to U.S. patents issued on the basis of
patent applications filed after June 8, 1995, provides for expiration 20 years after their filing dates. 35 U.S.C.
§ 154(a)(2) (1994).
61 35 U.S.C;§ 112 (1994).
62 See BENJAMINLEWiN, GmNES V 81-107 (1994).

" I

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49

diagnostic and forensic applications as well as research applications.
Researchers seeking to learn more about the functional significance of DNA
sequence information are likely to query the information in both computerreadable and molecular form. 63 The distinction between computer-readable
and molecular versions of DNA sequence is particularly difficult to maintain in
the context of DNA array technology. DNA array technology involves
immobilizing thousands of short oligonucleotide molecules on a substrate to
detect the presence of particular sequences in a sample using specialized
robotics and imaging equipment. 64 In effect, this technology enables people to
use computers to perceive information stored in DNA molecules in a sample.
When contemporary technology blurs the boundaries between computerreadable and molecular forms of DNA, what logic is there to drawing this
distinction in determining the patent rights of DNA sequencers?
A pragmatic reason for maintaining this distinction is that patent claims to
DNA sequences in molecular form have been and will probably continue to be
crucially important in motivating costly and risky investments in the
commercial development of new therapeutic proteins, which must be proven
safe and effective in human clinical trials before they can be brought to market.
The arguments for free access to DNA sequences as a means of promoting
scientific progress may have equal force whether the sequence is claimed in
electronic or molecular form, but the countervailing arguments for exclusivity
are far more powerful for DNA sequences in molecular form. The importance
of patents in motivating drug development is well established; 65 the importance
63 After sequencing DNA, researchers might analyze the sequence in computer-readable form to identify
similarities to known sequences, and then analyze the sequence in cell-readable form to observe the functional
significance of different portions of the sequence in a living cell or organism. They might, for example, use
DNA molecules as probes to determine when and where an organism expresses a particular portion of its DNA
sequence, or they might induce a cell to express a particular DNA sequence in order to learn more about the
protein that it encodes, or they might interrupt expression of a DNA sequence in an organism and observe the
consequences in order to learn more about the functions of the corresponding protein. This sort of interaction
between analysis ofelectronic information and observation of how cells use the information characterizes what
in recent years has become known as "functional genomics" research. See Stanley Fields, The Future is
Function, 15 NATURE GENErICs 325 (1997); Philip Hieter & Mark Boguski: FunctionalGenomics: It's All
How You Read It, 278 SciENcE 601 (1997).
64 See Roger Ekins and Frederick W. Chu, Microarrays:Their Origins and Applications, 17 TRENDS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY 217 (1999); Bob Sinclair, Everything's Great When It Sits on a Chip-A Bright Futurefor
DNA Arrays, THE ScINTsT, May 24, 1999, at 18.
65 See generally Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns From Industrial Research and
Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC AcrtvrrY 783-820 (1987) (indicating that the importance
of patents varies considerably across different industries and that patents are particularly important in the
pharmaceutical industry).
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of patents 66in motivating the development of information products is
speculative.
A final argument for maintaining a distinction between DNA sequence
information and DNA molecules at this point is consistency with tradition and
precedent. Any categorical exclusion of DNA molecules from eligibility for
patent protection would contradict the practice of the PTO and courts for two
decades and would undermine the precedent-based expectations of a patentsensitive industry. On the other hand, issuing patent claims that cover DNA
sequence information stored in computer-readable medium would extend
patentable subject matter beyond what the PTO and courts have recognized
thus far, and would depart from a long tradition of free access to the
information disclosed in issued patents. Genomics investors might hope to
receive such patents, but they can hardly claim to have relied on their
availability.
This analysis may seem stubbornly "bricks and mortar" in its focus on
tangibility as the touchstone for protection, and therefore out of step with the
needs of the modem information economy. If a significant portion of the value
of DNA sequencing resides in the information that it yields, rather than in the
molecules that correspond to that information, then perhaps we should not
assume that investments in creating that value will be forthcoming on the basis
of an intellectual property system that limits exclusionary rights to tan ible
things and allows the information itself to spill over to the general public. At
some point, we may need intellectual property rights that permit the creators of
information products to capture the value of the information itself in order to
motivate socially valuable investments. But if we have arrived at that point,
then we need to look beyond the patent system for a suitable model. The
patent system was designed to serve the needs of a "bricks and mortar" world,
and it would be foolish to assume that it can meet the changing needs of the

66 Proposals for special legislation to provide intellectual property protection for databases have
provoked a lively debate concerning the costs and benefits of such protection. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, Brrs OF POWER: ISSUES IN GLOBAL ACCESS TO SCIENTIFIC DATA (1997); NATIONAL RESEARCH

COUNCIL, A QUESTION OF BALANCE: PRIVATE RIGRTS AND THE PUBUJC INTEREST IN SCIENTIFIC AND
TECHNICAL DATABASES (1999).

67 The classic argument for intellectual property is that exclusionary rights are necessary to motivate
investments in the creation of goods that are costily to make initially, but cheap and easy to copy once someone
else has made the initial investmenL As growing volumes of information become freely available on the
internet, this argument seems to be overlooking significant incentives to create and disseminate information
outside the intellectual property system. See generally CARL SHAPImO & HAL VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES
(1999).
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information economy simply by expanding the categories of subject matter that
are eligible for patent protection.

